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Abstract—Can we distinguish between two wireless transmit-
ters sending exactly the same message, using the same protocol?
The opportunity for doing so arises due to subtle nonlinear
variations across transmitters, even those made by the same
manufacturer. Since these effects are difficult to model explicitly,
we investigate learning device fingerprints using complex-valued
deep neural networks (DNNs) that take as input the complex
baseband signal at the receiver. Such fingerprints should be
robust to ID spoofing, and to distribution shifts across days and
locations due to clock drift and variations in the wireless channel.
In this paper, we point out that, unless proactively discouraged
from doing so, DNNs learn these strong confounding features
rather than the subtle nonlinear characteristics that are the basis
for stable signatures. Thus, a network trained on data collected
during one day performs poorly on a different day, and networks
allowed access to post-preamble information rely on easily-
spoofed ID fields. We propose and evaluate strategies, based on
augmentation and estimation, to promote generalization across
realizations of these confounding factors, using data from WiFi
and ADS-B protocols. We conclude that, while DNN training has
the advantage of not requiring explicit signal models, significant
modeling insights are required to focus the learning on the effects
we wish to capture.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important tool in wireless security is a “fingerprint”
capable of distinguishing between devices that transmit exactly
the same message. This is possible due to subtle hardware
imperfections that occur even in devices made by the same
manufacturer [1]. Such fingerprints can serve as a powerful
authentication tool at the physical layer, complementing con-
ventional security schemes in higher layers of the networking
stack. In this paper, we seek fingerprints that are robust to
confounding factors in data collected over multiple days and
locations, including the carrier frequency offset (CFO), which
drifts over time, and the wireless channel, which depends on
the propagation environment.
In the literature, fingerprints are often extracted via protocol-
specific processing of the received wireless signal [2–11]. We
focus instead on an approach that is independent of the under-
lying protocol. Because the wireless signal is one-dimensional
(1D) complex-valued, we employ 1D convolutional neural
networks (CNNs) with complex-valued parameters to learn
fingerprints. When compared to prior work using real-valued
CNNs [12–14], these networks have a smaller degree of
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freedom at the synaptic level, which has been observed to
confer generalization benefits [15].
While the results in this paper demonstrate that 1D complex-
valued CNNs are indeed a promising approach for RF finger-
printing, we do not undertake an exhaustive search over real-
and complex-valued network architectures and nonlinearities
to optimize performance. Rather, our purpose here is to strike
a cautionary note: a key message is that the network learns the
easiest set of features that it can in order to accomplish the
desired task (in our case, discriminating between transmitters
based on the received wireless signal), hence we must be
extremely proactive in promoting robustness across effects that
we do not want the network to lock on to. For instance, we
would like the RF signature for a transmitter to be robust across
different days and for different wireless channels. However, if
we employ training data collected over a single day, the channel
and CFO for a transmitter are relatively constant, and the CNN
will lock onto these rather than to subtle nonlinear effects. This
gives unreasonably excellent accuracy on test data collected
over the same day, but disastrous results for data collected on
a different day, when both the channel and the CFO (which
drifts substantially over time) can be different. We show that
model-based augmentation strategies can significantly improve
robustness to these effects.
As another example, even if we train a network to process
the entire packet, it may choose to focus on fields that convey
information regarding the transmitter ID, such as the MAC
address in WiFi data, and the ICAO address in ADS-B signals
(Automatic Dependant Surveillance-Broadcast, an air traffic
control protocol). Since such fields can be easily spoofed by
an adversary, we must be vigilant against locking on them.
We demonstrate that networks are indeed vulnerable to such
involuntary “cheating”, and then show that restricting attention
to just the preamble, which is common to all packets from
all transmitters, suffices to obtain good accuracies. Our main
contributions are summarized below.
Contributions
• We demonstrate that protocol-agnostic fingerprinting is
possible using complex-valued CNNs, comparing design
choices for data from two different wireless protocols:
WiFi and ADS-B.
• When making use of post-preamble information, we show
that networks artificially inflate accuracies by relying on
device ID fields present in these sections. We then focus
on learning fingerprints from the preamble, which provides
reasonably good performance despite its short length.
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of a wireless communication system. Subtle nonlinearities unique to each device can provide a fingerprint.
However, easy-to-learn features such as the CFO and channel are not stable over time and location, affecting generalization.
• Using controlled emulations on a clean WiFi dataset, we
show major pitfalls in this approach when training and
testing on different days, due to the effect of propagation
channels and frequency offsets which are far stronger than
the nonlinear effects we seek to capture.
• We develop augmentation strategies based on signal models
for these effects, and evaluate performance against com-
pensation techniques that explicitly try to undo them. We
find that compensation works well only if the confounding
factors are simple enough, like the CFO. For more complex
effects, model-driven augmentation is essential for learning
robust signatures.
• We make publicly available a simulation-based dataset
based on models of some typical nonlinearities. The results
we obtain on this dataset are comparable to those from
measurement-based dataset, enabling reproducibility.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A generic model for a radio frequency (RF) wireless
transmitted signal (shown in Fig. 1) is as follows:
sRF(t) = sc(t) cos 2pifct− (t) sin 2pifct
where fc denotes the carrier frequency, or the frequency of the
electromagnetic wave that “carries” the information-bearing
waveforms sc (riding on the cosine of the carrier) and (riding
on the sine of the carrier). Typical parameters for WiFi, for
example, are fc of 2.4 or 5.8 GHz, and sc, having bandwidths
of 20 MHz.
The receiver strips the carrier away to recover sc(t) and (t),
and then processes them to decode the information bits that they
carry. For a typical wireless channel, there are multiple paths
from transmitter to receiver, so multiple delayed, attenuated
and phase-shifted versions of the transmitted waveform sum
up at the receiver. These transformations are best modeled by
thinking of the information-bearing waveform as a complex-
valued signal, s(t) = sc(t)+j(t), where j =
√−1. The effect
of a wireless channel is then modeled as a complex-valued
convolution. The carrier frequency used at the receiver is not
precisely the same as at the transmitter, and the impact of such
carrier frequency offset is also most conveniently modeled in
the complex domain.
While RF processing is designed to produce as little
distortion as possible, in practice, there are nonlinearities,
typically with some characteristics unique to each transmitter
because of manufacturing variations, which can in principle
provide RF signatures. Variations in components such as digital-
to-analog converters (DACs) and power amplifiers (PAs) are
inevitable even for transmitters manufactured using exactly the
same process. Transistors, resistors, inductors, and capacitors
within a device vary around nominal values, typically within
a designed level of tolerance, and the goal is to translate the
resulting variations in transmitter characteristics into a device
signature. We discuss here some example effects, depicted in
Figure 2, that may contribute towards such a signature.
• I-Q Imbalance: This results from mismatch in the gain and
phase of the in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) signal paths
for upconversion. The phase of the cosine and sine of the
carriers may not be offset by exactly pi/2, and the path
gains along the branches may not be equal.
• Differential Nonlinearity (DNL) due to DAC: DNL is defined
as the discrepancy between the ideal and obtained analog
values of two adjacent digital codes due to circuit component
non-idealities [16].
• PA Nonlinearity: Power amplifiers are ideally linear, but
start saturating at high input voltages. There is a significant
literature on PA modeling [17–20], as well as on the impact
of PA nonlinearities on communication systems with high
dynamic range such as OFDM [21, 22]. A common model
is a memoryless polynomial fit (typically up to third order)
of the form:
y(t) = a1x(t) + a2x
2(t) + a3x
3(t) + ...+ anx
n(t)
Recent promising results on wireless fingerprints for PA
nonlinearities, extracted using CNNs, are reported in [23].
We seek to devise DNNs that extract signatures based on
a combination of characteristics such as those in Figure 2,
while marginalizing over channels and CFOs. As noted in [24],
it is possible to extract signatures from either the transient
(microsecond-length) signals transmitted during the on/off
operation of devices, or via the steady-state packet information
present in between the start and end transients. We focus here
on work that employs the steady-state method since it is of
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Fig. 2: (a) Example variations of PA nonlinearities across transmitters, (b) Differential nonlinearity caused by DAC, (c)
Scatterplots of noisy 4-QAM constellation points with and without I-Q imbalance.
more practical utility [4]. Such prior work can be divided into
two categories: (i) approaches that use handcrafted features,
and (ii) machine learning based techniques.
Traditional approaches: An early approach to device finger-
printing was in [2], albeit only for wired devices in wide area
networks. The feature used in [2] was the clock skew, which
was observed to be fairly consistent over time, but varied
significantly across devices. This technique was extended in
[5] to wireless local area networks where timestamps in IEEE
802.11 frames contain more precise information about the clock
skew. However, [6] demonstrated deficiencies of the previous
two studies, presenting a spoofing attack based on the clock-
skew information generated by a fake access point. Despite the
drift in CFO and the relative ease of spoofing it at the physical
layer, recent proposals on CFO-based fingerprints include [9]
and [11]. In [25], WiFi fingerprinting was accomplished by
computing the power spectral density of the preamble, followed
by cross-correlation to match the spectra of an unknown signal
against a bank of known reference spectra. For RFID tags,
fingerprinting has been accomplished using power response
and timing features for UHF RFID [26–28], and a mixture of
timing and spectral features for HD RFID [29].
Machine learning based approaches: There are many papers
over the past decade using machine learning to derive finger-
prints. Much of this work involves significant protocol-specific
preprocessing, in contrast to the protocol-agnostic approach
considered in this paper. An early example is the use of support
vector machine (SVM) in [3] based on demodulation error
metrics such as frequency offset and I/Q offset. However,
this detection method was defeated in [30], who showed that
these modulation features could be impersonated with 50-
75% false accept rate via a low cost software-defined radio.
Another attack was independently developed by [31], which
achieved 100% impersonation rate using both SDRs and high-
end arbitrary waveform generators. Other examples of machine
learning based fingerprints include a k-nearest neighbor (k-NN)
classifier in [4] based on spectral analysis of WiFi preambles,
linear discriminant analysis (LDA) in [32] after pilot-aided
compensation of RF nonlinearities caused by the receiver, k-
means clustering of features based on inter-arrival times of
ADS-B messages [7], a neural network operating on WiFi
inter-arrival times [8], and a real-valued CNN operating on the
error signal obtained after subtracting out an estimated ideal
signal from frequency-corrected received data [10]. Section
V evaluates the robustness of our approach against protocol-
specific estimation strategies, showing that, while estimation
works well for simple phenomena such as CFO variations, the
augmentation approach that we study has a clear advantage
for more complex effects such as channel variations.
Modern CNNs learning directly from I/Q data include
[12, 13] for modulation classification, and [14] for device
fingerprinting. This line of work employs real-valued networks,
with real and imaginary parts of complex data treated as
different channels. Such networks have more degrees of
freedom compared to a complex network where the convolution
operation is more restricted. Consider a complex convolution
operation between input X and weight W , resulting in output
Y :
Re(Y )+j Im(Y ) = (Re(W )+j Im(W ))∗(Re(X)+j Im(X))
This can be rewritten in the following form [33, 34] with
the real and imaginary parts of the input stacked as different
channels:[
Re(Y )
Im(Y )
]
=
[
Re(W ) − Im(W )
Im(W ) Re(W )
]
∗
[
Re(X)
Im(X)
]
(1)
Therefore, a complex network with the CReLU activation
function (ReLU(Re(z)) + jReLU(Im(z))) can be considered
a regularized form of a real network, with the weight matrix
restricted to the structure in 1. This reduction in number of
degrees of freedom has been shown to improve generalization
performance [15]. We note that this analysis does not hold
for complex networks with the ModReLU activation function
(ReLU(|z|) exp(j∠z)), which we find yields better perfor-
mance than CReLU for our application (Section III). Complex-
valued CNNs with ModReLU architectures cannot be realized
by a real ReLU network. It was observed in [33] that for a
cell detection problem, complex networks achieve comparable
results to their real counterparts, but with slower convergence.
For other applications, it has been observed in recent work
4[34–38] that complex networks provide advantages over real
networks for the tasks of MRI fingerprinting [35], radar-based
terrain classification [36], audio source separation [37], music
transcription [34] and channel equalization [38]. Our results
in Section III on the gain provided for the fingerprinting
problem are in line with such prior work, and motivate further
exploration of neural networks tailored to complex-valued data.
It is worth noting that, for real-valued networks, standard
DNNs and CNNs are compared with multi-stage training
(MST) of simple building blocks for fingerprinting in [39],
with MST yielding the best performance. Such work highlights
the need for continued architectural experimentation for both
real- and complex-valued networks.
We should note that the concept of test time augmentation
proposed here is different from classical ensemble methods
such as boosting or bagging [40, 41]: rather than averaging
over an ensemble of machines, we are averaging over an
ensemble of inputs. Given recent promising results on the use
of boosting techniques in multilayer settings [42–44], it is of
interest to explore comparison and possibly combination of
such techniques with our augmentation strategy for deriving
RF signatures robust to confounding factors.
We note that the present paper builds on our conference
paper [45], which considers the impact of ID spoofing and
SNR on CNN-based fingerprinting. While we include a
part of the discussion from [45] here in order to provide
a complete treatment, our main focus here is different: we
wish to investigate generalization of fingerprints when the
data is collected across multiple days and locations. While
[45] considers noise augmentation to handle SNR mismatch
between training and test data, in the present paper, we consider
augmentation and compensation strategies for CFO and channel
here, and introduce the concept of test time augmentation for
handling confounding factors.
To our knowledge, our prior work [45] was the first to
employ complex-valued CNNs for wireless fingerprinting. It
precedes and is independent of [46], which also uses complex-
valued networks, and claims to be “the first [...] system able to
fingerprint devices using unprocessed raw signals in a range of
frequencies of interest.” Resilience to device ID spoofing was
studied in [47], with each packet randomly sliced into multiple
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Fig. 3: ModReLU and CReLU activation functions in the
complex plane. ModReLU preserves the phase of all inputs
outside a disc of radius b, while CReLU distorts all phases
outside the first quadrant. Figure adapted from [34].
training examples using sliding windows as in [14], followed
by a real-valued CNN. It was empirically observed that this
randomized windowing technique was resilient to spoofing of
the MAC ID in WiFi data. While this is an interesting strategy,
the range of window sizes that enable robustness is likely to be
dependent on the specific wireless protocol. This is in contrast
to our preamble-only approach which, in principle, is protocol-
agnostic, since the location of the preamble can be learnt in
unsupervised fashion by correlating packets across different
devices. In [48], channel-resilient fingerprinting was studied
by modifying the transmitter using a finite impulse response
(FIR) filter. Our work on channel resilience is based solely on
modifying DNN training and does not involve transmitter-side
alterations. In recent work appearing after the submission of
the present paper, [49, 50] reported a significant degradation
in fingerprinting accuracies when training and test data were
collected on different days, with fingerprints extracted using
real-valued CNNs. It was observed that channel equalization
improved performance in the different day scenario. However,
equalization caused a drop in accuracies when training and
test data were from the same day. These results are in line
with our observations in Section V-C: while equalization can
help, the residual error from this approach appears to swamp
out the nonlinear characteristics we are interested in. We find
model-based augmentation to be a more effective strategy for
learning robust fingerprints.
III. COMPLEX-VALUED REPRESENTATIONS
The subtle nonlinear effects discussed in the previous section
are difficult to model explicitly, hence deep learning is a natural
approach to teasing out transceiver signatures based on them.
We explore the use of complex-valued neural networks for
this purpose: these are well-matched to the complex baseband
received signal. Such networks have previously been used
for speech, music and vision tasks [34, 51]. Here, we learn
device fingerprints for two different wireless protocols: WiFi
and ADS-B.
Data: We provide results for the following external database:
• WiFi data containing a mix of IEEE 802.11a (fc =
5.8 GHz) and IEEE 802.11g (fc = 2.4 GHz) pack-
ets from 19 commercial-off-the-shelf devices, collected
indoors without channel distortion using a Tektronix
RSA5126B receiver.
• ADS-B air traffic control signals (fc = 1.09 GHz,
narrowband) collected in the wild from 100 airplanes
over a span of 10 days, using a Tektronix RSA5106B
receiver. These signals are used for transmitting airplane
position and velocity information to ground stations.
We use available oversampled data for both protocols, with
WiFi signals sampled at 200 MHz and ADS-B at 20 MHz.
The length of the preamble is then 3200 samples for WiFi and
320 samples for ADS-B.
Architecture: For complex layers, we explore the following
choices of activation functions, shown in Figure 3:
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• ModReLU - This function affects only the magnitude and
preserves phase. Here b is a learned bias.
ModReLU(z) = max(|z| − b, 0) ej z .
• CReLU - Here, separate ReLUs are applied to the real
and imaginary parts of the input. The phase of the output
is therefore restricted to [0, pi/2].
CReLU(z) = max(Re(z), 0) + jmax(Im(z), 0).
The loss in phase information can be potentially compen-
sated by using wider filters (i.e. with a larger number of
channels) capable of providing phase derotation.
Figure 4 depicts the complex-valued 1D CNN we use for
WiFi signals, using as input the I/Q data at the receiver,
restricted to the preamble. An | · |2 layer is used midway
through the network to convert complex representations to real
ones. The network architectures we use are listed below in
compact form (similar to the notation in [52]):
• ADS-B: 100C 40×20−100C 5×1−|· |2−Avg−100D.
• WiFi: 100C 200×100−100C 100×1−| · |2−100D−
100D − Avg.
The notation should be read as follows:
• 〈number of filters〉 C 〈convolution size〉 × 〈stride〉
• 〈number of neurons〉 D
where C denotes a convolutional layer, D a fully connected
layer, and Avg a temporal averaging layer.
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Fig. 5: Evolution of training accuracy over epochs for Mod-
ReLU and CReLU networks (ADS-B). ModReLU provides
a small gain in train and test accuracies over CReLU, with
similar convergence behavior.
Complex backpropagation is performed using the framework
of [34], taking partial derivatives of the cost with respect to
the real and imaginary parts of each parameter. Networks
are trained for 200 epochs with a batch size of 100, using
the Adam optimizer with default hyperparameters and weight
decay constant of 10−3. We normalize signals to unit power,
and use 200 samples per device for training and 100 for testing
for WiFi, and 400 samples per device for both training and
testing for ADS-B. Code is available at https://github.com/
metehancekic/wireless-fingerprinting.
Performance: We find that the ModReLU architecture out-
performs CReLU (shown in Fig. 5), without any difference
in convergence speed. Using the preamble alone, we obtain
99.62% fingerprinting accuracy for 19 WiFi devices, and
81.66% accuracy for 100 airplanes using the ADS-B protocol.
We compare the performance of complex-valued and real-
valued networks in Table I. For real networks, we follow the
approach of [12–14] in treating real and imaginary parts of
input data as different channels. For a fair comparison, we
consider real networks with different scaling factors for the
number of channels (the numbers in brackets in Table I). This
is to account for the fact that a complex filter would contain
twice as many parameters as an equivalent real filter. Since the
last two layers of the complex network are real-valued, we do
not scale the corresponding layers of the real network. We find
that the complex network outperforms all its real counterparts,
with a performance gain of 6.6% for ADS-B and 1.6% for
TABLE I: Performance comparison between complex-valued
and real-valued networks. The scaling factor in brackets refers
to the scaling for the number of channels.
Dataset Network type Accuracy Total number ofreal parameters
ADS-B Complex 81.66 128,400
Real 73.84 78,400
Real (1.4x) 73.25 133,680
Real (2x) 75.00 246,600
WiFi Complex 99.62 262,719
Real 97.50 162,319
Real (1.4x) 97.61 278,399
Real (2x) 97.94 512,519
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Fig. 6: Visualizations of the first and second convolutional layer for ADS-B (ModReLU architecture). Each row shows the
input signal that maximizes the activation of a particular filter, computed using gradient ascent starting from random noise
(with signals normalized to unit power at each step). Convolutional filters in the first layer span 2 input symbols; filters in the
second layer span 6 symbols.
WiFi.
Figure 6 depicts input signals that strongly activate filters
in the first and second layer of the ADS-B architecture. Since
device-specific nonlinear effects manifest primarily as short-
term transitions of amplitude and phase, the filters in the first
layer can capture these effects by spanning a small multiple
of the symbol interval (2 symbols).
IV. RESILIENCE TO ID SPOOFING
This section studies the potential benefits of using the entire
packet for fingerprinting. While this can yield averaging gains,
we must be proactive against locking on to device ID fields
which can be easily spoofed. We focus here on the ADS-B
protocol and begin by describing its packet structure.
Packet structure: The ADS-B data we use contains packets
of differing lengths (shown in Figure 7): 64 symbols for Mode
S, and 120 symbols for Mode S Extended. Therefore, we
prune all packets to a uniform length of 64 symbols. For
both packet types, the first 16 symbols consist of a preamble
common to all devices, while symbols 17–40 contain the
ICAO address which serves as a unique device identifier. To
determine whether networks lock on to this field, we consider
the following scenarios with offset data:
Preamble
16 bits
ICAO address
24 bits
Parity
24 bits
Preamble
16 bits
ICAO address
24 bits
Message: (x, y, z), v
56 bits
Parity
24 bits
Fig. 7: ADS-B packet structure. Top: Mode S. Bottom: Mode
S Extended. While the first 16 symbols of both packet types
are device-independent, the following 24 symbols are highly
device-dependent.
• an offset of zero,
• a randomly chosen offset, and
• a fixed offset where we choose the last 64 symbols.
Performance: Fig. 8 reports on results for each scenario.
At first glance, using the entire packet appears to yield
substantial gains: we obtain 99.29% accuracy when not using
any offset. This is a 17 point improvement over the preamble-
only accuracy reported in the previous section. However,
performance actually drops in the scenarios with offsets,
yielding 65.64% and 75.49% accuracy. The picture becomes
clearer when we closely examine results for the two packet
types. These have identical accuracies without any offset, but
in all other scenarios, Mode S dominates performance. This
temporal dependence indicates that the network is focusing on
device IDs from the payload for Mode S. It is easy to obtain
99% accuracy by restricting attention to the ICAO address,
which is a clear indicator of “cheating”.
A natural solution that comes to mind is to delete the
symbols corresponding to the device ID. However, we again
obtain artificially high accuracies. This is due to the presence
of parity bits correlated with the ICAO address: the network is
able to reconstruct a device identifier from the combination of
parity and preamble sections. Another solution might be to set
filters in first layer of the network to span only 2 symbols, so
that we avoid learning the device ID (which spans 24 symbols).
This yields an accuracy of 97.28%, which is still substantially
higher than the preamble-only scenario. Small kernel sizes in
the first layer alone are not sufficient to prevent cheating: one
just needs to look at the second layer to see that its filters
actually extend over 6 symbols.
These results show that allowing a network access to packet
payloads is unwise: networks involuntarily “cheat” whenever
given the chance, ignoring device-specific nonlinearities in
favor of easily spoofed ID fields. This behavior can be avoided
by restricting attention to the preamble, and this is what we
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Fig. 8: Classification accuracies for ADS-B (100 devices) when
using the entire packet. Here, we use architecture 100C 100×
50− | · |2 − 100C 10× 2− Avg− 100D.
choose to do in the rest of this paper. We leave as an open
issue the problem of certifiably sanitizing ID information from
the remainder of the packet.
V. STABILITY TO VARIATIONS IN SPACE AND TIME
In this section, we use the clean WiFi dataset for controlled
experiments emulating the effect of frequency drift and
channel variations. We show that these fluctuations can have
a disastrous effect on performance and study compensation
and augmentation strategies to promote robustness.
A. Nuisance Parameters, Compensation and Augmentation
Before providing specific results, we lay out our overall
framework.
Consider input data x (the packet preamble in our case) fed
to a neural network which aims to classify the device ID y.
In our present context, we may think of this input data as a
transformation of an ideal input xideal capturing the desired
characteristics of the device, passed through a transformation
fθ, where θ is a nuisance parameter such as a CFO or channel:
x = fθ(xideal). A network trained with such inputs would
ideally produce posteriors p(y|x) = p(y|fθ(xideal)) as the
softmax outputs. In the scenarios of interest, we define a
single “day” of training as a scenario in which θ is fixed
during the training period for a given device, but differs
across different devices. In this case, it is natural for the
DNN to use information in θ to classify devices. Indeed, if
the discrimination based on θ is easier than that based on the
subtle nonlinear signatures buried in xideal, then the DNN
will focus on using θ rather than the information in xideal.
When we then test on a different “day” when the value of the
nuisance parameter θ is different, we understandably get poor
performance.
Compensation: If we have detailed protocol-level information
and good enough models, then it is possible to try to invert
fθ to recover xideal from x, and to then train the DNN based
on this estimate. For example, we can estimate and undo a
CFO, or equalize a channel. For the particular experiments we
do, we find that compensation works well for simple nuisance
parameters such as the CFO, but that the residual errors after
equalization are enough to swamp out the subtle nonlinear
effects we are after.
Augmentation: An alternative to protocol-specific compensation
strategies is to use models for how the nuisance parameters
operate on the input to augment the data. Specifically, we create
new inputs of the form x′ = fθaug(x), where we choose θaug
from a set Θ such that
x′ = fθaug(x) = fθaug(fθ(xideal)) ≈ fθ′(xideal) , θ′ ∈ Θ
where θ′ is an “effective” nuisance parameter. Now, if we train
the DNN using multiple augmentations of x, then we hope
that the network learns to use xideal to a greater extent than
before, since we are varying θ′ for a given device. Nevertheless,
standard training does not guarantee marginalization over θ′.
Rather, it allows the network to produce posteriors of the form
p(y|x′) = p(y|fθaug(fθ(xideal))) ≈ p(y|fθ′(xideal)), where
hopefully the information from xideal is being used to a greater
extent because of training augmentation. When we are now
presented with a fresh test input x = fθ(xideal), we are
not guaranteed that this particular realization of the nuisance
parameter θ is comfortably far from the decision boundaries
that the network has learnt. On the other hand, test time
augmentation allows us to generate multiple effective nuisance
parameter realizations which we can average over.
1
|Θtest|
∑
θaug∈Θtest
p
(
y|fθaug(fθ(xideal))
)
(2)
Thus, we are effectively averaging over |Θtest| realizations of
the “effective” nuisance parameters θ′.
B. Carrier Frequency Offset
We first examine robustness to carrier frequency offset
(CFO), caused by frequency mismatch in the crystal oscillators
at the transmitter and receiver. Since the CFO depends on
the transmitter, it could potentially be used as a feature to
fingerprint devices [3, 11]. However, this has the following
key drawbacks:
• Oscillator frequencies drift substantially over time, leading
to an unstable signature. Training and test data collected
over different days could contain different CFOs, which,
as we show below, significantly degrades performance.
Oscillator frequencies are affected by a few parts per
million (ppm) for every 1◦ C change [53], as well as by
aging [54], and therefore drift daily, making it an unstable
feature for fingerprinting.
• The CFO can be easily spoofed by an adversary manipu-
lating baseband signals. As noted in [10], this does not
require access to a software defined radio: the CFO can be
spoofed by an adversarial device with a precise oscillator.
Therefore, it is important for a network to avoid involuntary
use of the CFO as a fingerprint. We investigate this by
artificially inserting offsets in data, emulating an oscillator
frequency tolerance of ± 20 parts per million as specified in
8the IEEE 802.11 standard [55]. We begin with an example
where only the test data is offset.
Offset in test data alone: We find that networks trained on
clean data do not generalize to offset data, even when the offset
is very small: as shown in the first row of Table II, accuracy
drops to 4.6% at an offset of 20 ppm. In order to alleviate
this, we augment the training set with randomly chosen CFOs
and report results in the second and third rows of Table II.
We consider two types of random offsets: Bernoulli {−20, 20}
ppm and uniform (−20, 20) ppm, augmenting the size of the
training set by 5x in each scenario.
This strategy can significantly help in learning robust
fingerprints, but the type of augmentation matters: in particular,
it is insufficient to augment with worst-case offsets alone.
When we train with Bernoulli offsets, the network becomes
robust to Bernoulli test offsets (99.3%), but fails to generalize
to any offset smaller than 20 ppm, including an offset of zero.
In contrast, when we augment data with uniformly chosen
offsets, we obtain resilience (>90%) to all test set offsets in
the desired range.
"Different day" scenario (no augmentation or compensa-
tion): We now emulate collecting training data on one day
and testing on another: given clean data xideal, we add CFOs
θ to emulate the effect of different days: fθ(xideal). We insert
different “physical” offsets for each device, but fix the offset for
all packets from a particular device. The offsets are randomly
chosen in the range (−40, 40) ppm (since both the transmitter
and receiver oscillators can vary by ±20 ppm). Oscillator drift
across days is realized via different random seeds for training
and test offsets.
This “different day” setting makes it particularly easy for
the network to focus on the CFO as a fingerprint: since each
device has a different offset on each day, training on a single
day leads to the DNN focusing on using the CFO as a means of
distinguishing between devices. This results in artificially high
training accuracies (94.2%), but poor test set performance
(9.7%) on a different day when the devices have different
CFOs. We now explore two strategies to restore performance:
data augmentation with randomly chosen CFOs, and frequency
compensation.
"Different day" scenario with augmentation: In order to
promote robustness, we add new, randomly chosen CFOs
TABLE II: Performance when only the test data is offset, with
CFOs in the range (-20, 20) ppm. The first row shows that this
results in poor accuracies if we do not modify our training
strategy. Rows 2 and 3 then demonstrate that augmenting
training data with uniformly distributed CFOs helps confer
robustness.
Type of data
augmentation
CFO in test set
None Bernoulli Uniform
None 99.50 4.63 13.58
Bernoulli 3.32 99.32 13.53
Uniform 96.21 90.79 95.37
TABLE III: Performance in the “different day” CFO setting,
with CFOs in the range (-40, 40) ppm. “Random” training
augmentation uses a new randomly chosen CFO for each
packet, while the “orthogonal” type uses the same set of
offsets across devices. In both cases, the offsets are drawn
from a uniform distribution.
Training
augmentation
Test time augmentation
None 5 20 100
None – 9.68 7.84 8.74 8.47
Random 5 74.21 71.84 74.21 77.37
20 72.79 75.84 78.05 80.05
Orthogonal 5 69.58 75.11 81.05 83.63
20 82.37 82.32 86.21 87.11
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Fig. 9: Comparison of frequency compensation and augmenta-
tion in the “different day” CFO scenario as we increase the
number of training augmentations. The test set is augmented
by 100x throughout. The baseline corresponds to a network
trained without any augmentation or compensation.
θaug on top of the CFOs used for different day emulation:
fθaug(fθ(xideal)). Table III reports on the efficacy of various
CFO augmentation strategies, capable of increasing test
accuracy to 87.1%. For training data, we find that the best
augmentation technique is to use a different augmentation
offset for each packet from a device, but the same set of
offsets across devices, which discourages the network from
learning the CFO as a means of distinguishing between devices.
We term this an “orthogonal” strategy: we are trying to train
in a direction “orthogonal” to the tendency to lock onto the
“physical” CFO as a signature.
A novel finding is that data augmentation for testing leads
to significant performance gains when we add up soft outputs
across augmented versions of each test packet. The best result
is obtained when we insert a different randomly chosen CFO
for each of a 100 copies of each test data packet, and then
sum up the softmax outputs across the augmented data. We
find that averaging of logits also improves performance, but
not to the extent of the softmax average.
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(c) 100 test augmentations.
Fig. 10: Plots showing how test augmentation affects the histogram of softmax outputs p(yˆ) (averaged over augmentations)
for data from two specific classes (y = 4 and y = 7), in the “different day” channel setting. Histograms are normalized to be
probability densities. As the number of test augmentations increases, the probability of correct prediction p(yˆ = 4|y = 4) and
p(yˆ = 7|y = 7) shifts towards 1.
"Different day" scenario with frequency compensation:
We can also estimate and correct the offset using knowledge
of the periodic structure of the preamble. Consider a periodic
signal s[n] with period L, and frequency offset θ resulting in
r[n] = s[n] exp(j2pin θ). Since we know that s[n] = s[n+L],
the CFO can be estimated by correlating r with its shifted
version:
θ̂ =
1
2piL
∠
(∑
n
r[n] r∗[n+ L]
)
.
We follow a two-step approach [56] involving a coarse estimate
from the 802.11 short training sequence (L = 16) and then
a fine estimate from the long training field (L = 64). This
method restores accuracy to 97.7%, and, as shown in Fig. 9,
its accuracy is about 6.2% better than that with augmentation.
Residual approach: An interesting way to combine the above
two strategies is by excising a reconstruction of the transmitted
message based on a linear model to obtain a residual signal
containing device nonlinearities. Using the estimated CFO and
known preamble sequence, we can compute an ideal noiseless
reconstruction r̂ [n] of the received signal r[n]. The residual
noise r[n]− r̂ [n] can then be used as input to the CNN. While
this alone is not sufficient to restore performance across days
(the noise signal still contains CFO effects), we can use a
combination of the residual technique and augmentation to
obtain an improvement over pure augmentation, as shown in
Fig. 9. Stripping out the message in this manner makes it
easier for the network to learn nonlinear signatures.
There is a clear tradeoff between the different approaches
considered: CFO estimation is less resource-intensive, but it
requires detailed knowledge of the underlying protocol, unlike
augmentation.
C. Multipath Channels
The wireless channel is another important source of distri-
bution shift between training and test data. Since multipath
components in the channel depend on propagation geometry, a
network that locks on to the channel will fail to generalize to
test data collected on a different day or location. If the training
data does not span a sufficiently diverse set of geometries,
it could contain channels that are highly correlated with the
transmitter ID, necessitating the use of channel augmentation
or equalization strategies to improve robustness.
We study the impact of multipath on fingerprinting using a
Rayleigh fading model [57] with L multipath components:
h(t) =
L∑
k=1
Ake
jφkδ(t− τk),
where Ak ∼ Rayleigh (Pk), φk ∼ Uniform (0, 2pi) and δ(·) is
the Dirac delta function. We use the Extended Pedestrian A
(EPA) profile, a well-known statistical channel model used in
LTE system testing [58]. As shown in Table IV, this profile
quantifies the delays τk and relative powers Pk of the multipath
components.
“Different day” scenario (no augmentation or equaliza-
tion): We investigate training and testing on different days
similar to prior CFO experiments. Using the EPA profile, we
use different realizations of the channel vector for each day and
for each device. Each realization has 7 multipath components
chosen from a Rayleigh distribution with relative powers and
delays specified in Table IV. We do not vary the channel
realization for a given device on a given day, hence we are
modeling quasi-static environments. With single day training,
we get excellent performance when testing on the same day
(98%), but very poor accuracy if we test on a different day
(5.8%). This clearly indicates a lack of robustness to channel
TABLE IV: Power-delay profile for the EPA multipath fading
model. Tap amplitudes Ak are Rayleigh distributed with
variance Pk.
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
τk (ns) 0 30 70 90 110 190 410
Pk (dB) 0.0 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0 -8.0 -17.2 -20.8
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variations, with the network involuntarily locking on to the
channel as a means of discriminating between devices.
"Different day" scenario with augmentation: Assuming the
received data is fθ(xideal), we study the effect of channel aug-
mentation θaug on top of the emulated data: fθaug(fθ(xideal)).
We find that augmentation helps, but accuracy increases only
to 47.8% in the “train on one day, test on another” setting.
We can boost performance to 71.8% if we are allowed access
to training data collected over 2 days (without increasing the
size of the training set) and test on a third day, as shown in
Table V. Note that accuracy without augmentation is still low.
If training data spans 3 days, augmentation improves accuracy
even further to 79.7%.
This phenomenon can be understood by modeling channel
variations in the frequency domain. Suppose transmitter i sends
message Xi over “physical” channel Hi
Yi(f) = Hi(f)Xi(f),
and we augment with randomly chosen channels G:
Y˜i(f) = G(f)Yi(f)
= G(f)Hi(f)Xi(f).
The effective channel G(f)Hi(f) will still contain all the
nulls of Hi, which could potentially be correlated with the
transmitter ID. Thus, augmentation alone cannot completely
remove the effect of the underlying physical channel. Access to
more varied training data, when combined with augmentation,
increases the diversity of the overall channel that the network
sees.
The preceding results are achieved using 20 training and
100 test augmentations (with soft outputs added up over 100
augmented copies of each test packet). As before, we find
that the “orthogonal” approach works the best for training:
using the same set of channels across devices discourages
the network from learning to use the channel as a fingerprint.
Fig. 10 illustrates the impact of test time augmentation on the
distribution of soft outputs p(yˆ) for two sample devices. If
we do not augment the test set, many samples from device
4 are misclassified as device 7 (shown in the first row of
Fig. 10a). As the number of test augmentations increases (Fig.
10b, 10c), we get increasingly precise estimates of the desired
TABLE V: Performance in the “different day” channel setting
when we train on 2 days and test on a third day. “Random”
augmentation uses a randomly drawn channel for each packet,
while the “orthogonal” type uses the same set of channels
across devices.
Training
augmentation
Test time augmentation
None 1 5 20 100
None – 5.74 6.74 7.26 7.21 7.26
Random 5 39.58 39.79 54.05 59.84 62.68
20 54.05 52.84 63.21 67.68 68.47
Orthogonal 5 41.16 42.16 52.89 56.68 58.68
20 56.16 54.74 66.47 71.00 71.84
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Fig. 11: Comparison of channel equalization and augmentation
as we increase the number of days over which training data
is collected (with the size of the training set kept constant).
Baseline performance is reported for a network trained without
augmentation or equalization.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of days
20
40
60
80
100
A
cc
u
ra
cy
Impact of CFO and channel variations
Augmentation - 10x Ch, 1x CFO
Augmentation - 10x Ch, 10x CFO
Baseline
Fig. 12: Performance of training augmentation across days
when there is a combination of CFO and channel variations.
We use the orthogonal augmentation approach for channels
and the random method for CFOs.
prediction (2), causing p(yˆ = 7|y = 4) to shift towards 0, and
p(yˆ = 4|y = 4) towards 1.
“Different day” scenario with equalization: Another strategy
to remove channel influence would be to equalize signals
using the long training field of the WiFi preamble. We
equalize data in the frequency domain and compare results
with augmentation in Fig. 11. Each experiment is performed
with 5 different seeds, with error bars denoting one standard
deviation from the mean. We find that equalization performs
much poorer than channel augmentation, with a performance
gap of 26.5% even with 20 training days. It appears that the
residual distortion after equalization is large enough to swamp
out the nonlinear characteristics that we are interested in.
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Residual approach: In a manner similar to the previous
section, we compute a noiseless reconstruction of the received
signal by convolving the estimated channel with the known
preamble, and then subtract it out to obtain residual noise.
When combined with augmentation, we obtain accuracies that
are competitive with, but not better than, pure augmentation, as
shown in Fig. 11. The noise in channel estimation prevents the
residual method from offering a clear advantage in accuracy
like in the CFO scenario.
Overall, augmentation is the best of the three considered
strategies for making networks insensitive to channel effects:
with 10 training days, it can restore accuracy to as high as
97.7%.
D. Combination of Channel and Carrier Offsets
Lastly, we focus on a combination of channel and carrier
offsets across different days. This is a harsher and more realistic
setting than prior experiments, with test set accuracy without
augmentation or compensation no better than random guessing
(5%) even if we collect training data over 20 days.
Augmentation: We explore data augmentation with different
amounts of augmented CFOs and channels, and report results
in Figs. 12 and 13. We find equal numbers of augmented CFOs
and channels to work well: this improves performance from
5% to 90.10% with 20 training days. For test augmentation to
yield benefits, we find that the number of test augmentations is
important: as shown in Fig. 13b, if we only augment test data
2 times, we observe a drop in accuracy. This is because the
Bayesian average (2) requires a large number of realizations
of the two nuisance parameters (CFO, channel) in order to be
accurate.
Estimation: Table VI reports on comparisons with estimation
strategies, the residual approach and also a mix of estimation
and augmentation. We find that equalization, when combined
with either CFO compensation or augmentation, results in
only 10% accuracy and therefore do not include it in the
comparison. The best result is obtained by a combination
of CFO compensation and channel augmentation for both
training and test sets, with competitive performance from pure
augmentation when the number of days of training is large.
E. Simulated Dataset
While the datasets used in the previous sections are not
publicly available, in the interest of reproducibility of our
results, and as a contribution to the community, we have
TABLE VI: Comparison of augmentation, estimation and the
residual approach when both the CFO and channel vary.
Training strategy
Number of days
2 5 10 20
Residual + augmentation 19.11 26.21 67.50 78.95
Pure augmentation 24.90 49.36 77.83 90.10
CFO comp. + channel aug. 33.96 62.63 88.96 91.40
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(a) Effect of increasing training augmentations.
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Fig. 13: Accuracy as a function of the amount of augmentation
when both the CFO and channel fluctuate. We augment the
CFO and channel by equal amounts, with the x-axis denoting
the number of augmentations for each.
created a simulation-based WiFi dataset based on models
of some typical nonlinearities. We implement two different
kinds of circuit-level impairments: I/Q imbalance and power
amplifier nonlinearity, with Figure 15 depicting the order in
which the nonlinear effects were added. We skip effects of the
digital to analog converter such as DNL and INL. In a manner
similar to prior sections, we perform experiments to study
the effect of channel and CFO variations on fingerprinting
performance. We now discuss the models and parameters used
to generate the nonlinear effects.
I/Q Imbalance: I/Q imbalance can be modeled as follows,
with parameters  and φ representing gain and phase mismatch
respectively:
s˜RF(t) = sc(t)
(
1 +

2
)
cos
(
2pifct+
φ
2
)
− (t)
(
1− 
2
)
sin
(
2pifct− φ
2
)
(3)
Since the IEEE 802.11 WiFi standard [55] specifies an error
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TABLE VII: Fingerprinting performance on the simulated dataset in the “different day ” scenario for both CFOs and channels.
(a) Performance when we use 20 days for training, and then test on a different day.
Training Strategy Test time Augmentation
None 1 100
No aug. or comp. 7.61±3.83 6.68±1.76 8.30±4.78
Pure augmentation 81.38±4.91 77.56±3.57 86.24±2.95
CFO comp. + channel aug. 81.59±2.48 81.98±1.52 91.80±2.11
(b) Performance when we use a single day for training, and then test on a different day.
Training Strategy Test time Augmentation
None 1 100
No aug. or comp. 5.47±4.49 2.72±1.07 3.90±2.75
Pure augmentation 7.63±4.37 5.48±3.01 6.70±3.26
CFO comp. + channel aug. 11.10±5.29 8.99±1.06 11.31±4.92
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Fig. 14: Simulated power amplifier nonlinearities for different
devices.
vector magnitude (EVM) of −19 dB, we set  ≤ 0.2 and
|φ| ≤ pi/30. . In order to simulate 19 different devices (similar
to original dataset) we choose distinct  values for each device
from the set [0, 0.2] uniformly, i.e. {0, 0.2/19, 0.4/19...}.
Similarly, we pick φ from the set [−pi/30, pi/30] uniformly. We
note that all the values are shuffled randomly before matching
to each device, therefore extreme cases for both parameters
are (most likely) not on the same device.
Power Amplifier Nonlinearity: Power amplifier (PA) is
another source of circuit-level nonlinearity that varies across
devices. There are a number of different models for this
nonlinearity [17–20]. We model PA nonlinearities as a saturated
third-order polynomial function:
y(t) =
{
x(t) · (1− 0.44|x(t)|23P1dB ) if |x(t)|2 ≤ P1dB0.44
x(t)
|x(t)|
√
P1dB if |x(t)|2 > P1dB0.44
. (4)
where P1 dB corresponds to compression point. This function
is parametrized by the 1 dB compression point (P1 dB) which
is defined as the output power level at which the gain decreases
1 dB from its constant value. Similar to I/Q imbalance, we
determine the range of the values for P1 dB that satisfy the
EVM specifications. We choose P1 dB values specific for each
device uniformly from the set [8.45, 20], shuffling them across
devices. Note that we add the PA nonlinearity after first adding
I/Q imbalance to the ideal preamble. Figure 14 shows the
corresponding transfer function for each device.
Adding AWGN to create the dataset: After obtaining
preamble signals with nonlinear features for 19 different
devices, we create training, validation and test datasets by
adding additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) such that
SNR = 20 dB for each dataset. For training, we use 200
signals per device from 19 devices. The validation and test sets
contain 100 signals per device. Overall, the dataset contains
3800 signals for training, 1900 signals for validation and 1900
signals for the test set.
Results: We use the same complex-valued network previously
used for the clean WiFi dataset. For training, we make use of
the same hyperparameters as before, except for the number
of epochs, which we set to 100. We observe trends similar
to our results on the clean WiFi data in the “different day”
scenario: model-based augmentation can significantly help
improve performance if data is collected over multiple days
for training, and then tested on a different day. We report on
these results in Table VII.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While complex-valued CNNs are a promising tool for
learning RF signatures, blind adoption of these networks is
dangerous due to confounding factors that impede general-
ization across space and time. We have shown that training
augmentation tied to the physical phenomena driving these
effects is a critical tool for learning robust signatures. A
novel finding is that test augmentation, with soft combining
of likelihoods across augmented data, yields substantial per-
formance gains. An alternative to augmentation is to estimate
and undo the effects of confounding factors using detailed,
protocol-specific models, but our results indicate that residual
errors from such a classical approach may be enough to
swamp out the weaker nonlinear effects that constitute a stable
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Fig. 15: Block diagram showing how we add nonlinear effects to data to obtain the simulation-based dataset.
signature. While a judicious combination of estimation and
augmentation can confer robustness, using augmentation alone
is attractive because it is a powerful general-purpose strategy
which requires minimal protocol modeling.
There are a number of open issues for further investigation.
While we show that 1D complex CNNs are an interesting
approach for 1D complex-valued data, there remains scope for
extensive exploration in architectures (including real-valued
neural networks with difference choices of nonlinearities) and
data preprocessing. Fundamental detection-theoretic limits
on robust fingerprinting based on simulation-based models
which we control may provide valuable guidance for such
explorations, and characterize how far we can go in terms
of the number of devices that can be reliably distinguished.
It is also of interest to develop provably robust methods of
fusing information from preamble and post-preamble sections
of data, in order to utilize all the available data. We have
focused on transmitter signatures for a fixed receiver. Since
each receiver introduces its own characteristics, issues such
as transfer learning across receivers, as well as of combining
signature information across multiple cooperating receivers, are
interesting topics for further investigation. Another important
area for future work is exploration of the robustness of DNN-
based RF signatures to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks
and defenses are a topic of intensive investigation in the context
of standard image datasets [59–61], but it is of interest to
explore threat models that are specifically tailored to wireless
physical layer security. We note also that there is substantial
scope to explore different kinds of RF signatures, depending
on the application. Our inquiry is based on the question of
whether it is possible to extract location- and environment-
independent device signatures, so that the wireless channel is
a confounding factor. However, there are applications in which
we may wish to use the the wireless channel to provide a
location-specific signature. Finally, it is important to investigate
RF and mixed signal circuit design issues associated with
the concept of RF signatures, including the potential for
deliberately introducing manufacturing variations to enable
discrimination, and characterization of the stability of device
nonlinearities to environmental variations (e.g., in temperature
and moisture).
APPENDIX
Architecture details for the CNNs we use are reported
in Tables VIII and IX, specifying the size and number of
parameters in each layer for all the networks considered. Kernel
sizes are specified using the notation [convolution size, no.
of input channels, no. of output channels]. For real networks,
the scaling factor in brackets refers to the scaling for the
number of channels. Since the last two layers of the complex
network are real-valued, we do not scale the corresponding
layers of the real network. In order to prevent overfitting, in
real valued networks we use dropout after fully connected
layers [62] with drop probability p = 0.5 and weight decay
with `2 norm regularization parameter λ set to 0.0001. For
complex networks, we use the same weight decay but without
dropout. For weight initialization, we use the complex-valued
Glorot initialization from [34] for complex layers, and the
real-valued Glorot [63] for real layers. For training, we use
the Adam optimizer with learning rate η = 0.001, with batch
size of 100 and for 200 epochs. For all experiments, we use
Keras [64] with Theano backend, since complex-valued layers
are implemented in Keras. We use the NVIDIA GeForce GTX
1080Ti GPU and observe that an epoch of training takes about
0.8 seconds, when using the WiFi data with 200 samples per
device (from 19 devices).
To assess performance, we have used the average of 5
different runs with different random seeds for initial weights
and with different random realizations of CFOs and channels
used for emulation and augmentation. In all the graphs in
Section V, error bars denote one standard deviation from the
mean over different runs. Confusion matrices are reported in
Fig. 8. We have also carried out 5-fold cross validation, where
we use 5 different randomly chosen partitions of the data for
training and testing, with the result that there is very little
variation in performance. We provide an example result: when
we use stratified 5-fold cross validation for the 20 day channel
experiment, using data augmentation only on training set, we
obtain test accuracies of 91.42%, 91.58%, 85.95% 91.47%,
96.58%. (Since there is no test time augmentation for this
particular result, we note that these numbers are slightly lower
than the numbers reported in Figure 11).
The clean WiFi dataset was collected in a controlled indoor
setting over the air. We analyzed the data by demodulating it
and estimating the channel from the preamble, and observed
that the channel was mostly flat (Fig. 18). Fig. 17 shows the
histogram of estimated CFOs from the clean WiFi dataset.
Since the CFO variations across devices is small, we did not
compensate for them prior to our emulations.
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TABLE VIII: Architecture details for CNNs used in ADS-B fingerprinting.
(a) Complex-valued CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Complex Input Layer – – [320, 1] –
Complex Conv. [40, 1, 100] – [15, 100] 8000
ModRelu – [100] [15, 100] 100
Complex Conv. [5, 100, 100] – [11, 100] 100000
ModRelu – [100] [11, 100] 100
Absolute Value – – [11, 100] –
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Total 128400
(b) Real (1x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [320, 2] –
Real Conv. [40, 2, 100] [100] [15, 100] 8100
Real Conv. [5, 100, 100] [100] [11, 100] 50100
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Total 78400
(c) Real (1.4x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [320, 2] –
Real Conv. [40, 2, 140] [140] [15, 140] 11340
Real Conv. [5, 140, 140] [140] [11, 140] 98140
Global Average Pooling – – [140] –
Real Fully Connected [140, 100] [100] [100] 14100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Total 133680
(d) Real (2x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [320, 2] –
Real Conv. [40, 2, 200] [200] [15, 200] 16200
Real Conv. [5, 200, 200] [200] [11, 200] 200200
Global Average Pooling – – [200] –
Real Fully Connected [200, 100] [100] [100] 20100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [100] 10100
Total 246600
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TABLE IX: Architecture details for CNNs used in WiFi fingerprinting.
(a) Complex-valued CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Complex Input Layer – – [3200, 1] –
Complex Conv. [200, 1, 100] [100] [31, 100] 40200
ModRelu – [100] [31, 100] 100
Complex Conv. [100, 100, 100] – [22, 100] 200200
ModRelu – [100] [22, 100] 100
Absolute Value – – [22, 100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 19] [19] [19] 1919
Total 262719
(b) Real (1x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [3200, 2] –
Real Conv. [200, 2, 100] [100] [31, 100] 40100
Real Conv. [100, 100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 100100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 19] [19] [19] 1919
Total 162319
(c) Real (1.4x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [3200, 2] –
Real Conv. [200, 2, 140] [140] [31, 140] 56140
Real Conv. [100, 140, 140] [140] [22, 140] 196140
Real Fully Connected [140, 100] [100] [22, 100] 14100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 19] [19] [19] 1919
Total 278399
(d) Real (2x) CNN
Layer Kernel size Bias size Output shape No. of real parameters
Stacked Re/Im Input Layer – – [3200, 2] –
Real Conv. [200, 2, 200] [200] [31, 200] 80200
Real Conv. [100, 200, 200] [200] [22, 200] 400200
Real Fully Connected [200, 100] [100] [22, 100] 20100
Real Fully Connected [100, 100] [100] [22, 100] 10100
Global Average Pooling – – [100] –
Real Fully Connected [100, 19] [19] [19] 1919
Total 512519
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Fig. 16: Confusion matrices for fingerprinting of (a) the ADSB dataset (100 devices), (b) the clean WiFi dataset in the “different
day” channel scenario (19 devices) (c) the clean WiFi dataset in the “different day” channel + CFO scenario (19 devices). For
both (b) and (c), we use 20 days for training and a different day for testing, and perform 10 training augmentations.
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Fig. 17: Histograms of carrier frequency offset (in parts per million) in the clean WiFi data.
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Fig. 18: Estimated channel frequency response of a sample
signal from the clean WiFi dataset.
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